

Security Threats on Eastern Border and Pakistan's Foreign Policy (1947-55)**Jehangir Khan¹, PhD, Manzoor Ahmad², PhD and Ayaz Ali Shah³**^{1,2}Assistant Prof.Department of Political Science,
Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Pakistan³ LecturerDepartment of Political Science,
Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Pakistan(Received: Dec. 2014 & Published Online: Mar. Issue 2015)**Abstract**

Pakistan's foreign policy has always remained India-centric since 1947. During the 1947-55 era, two main objectives were the driving forces behind the decision making process in the foreign policy realm; security and foreign economic assistance. To achieve these ends, Pakistan approached the West rather than the Soviet Union and offered conditioned support against the communist spillover in South Asia. But, later on, Pakistan entered the US-backed anti-Soviet alliances without getting any security guarantee from the US. This changed the entire spectrum of Pakistan's foreign policy. This paper aims at analyzing the strategic, political and economic impacts of this changed overture. It explores the cost and benefit ratio of these two phases of foreign policy. Its implication for security and economic affairs of Pakistan would also be highlighted. The repercussions of US-Pakistan relations for Pakistani institutions would also be taken into account.

Keywords: Foreign Policy; Pakistan; India; US; Soviet Union; alignment**Introduction:**

The *raison d'être* of Pakistan's foreign policy has been to safeguard and sustain its sovereignty against Indian threats on its eastern border while to have a peace on its western border.¹ On the one hand, the hostile behavior and hegemonic designs of Indian leadership left no room for Pakistan except finding an outside balancer to check Indian belligerency and, thus, to safeguard its territorial integrity and national sovereignty.² On the other hand, Pakistan's western neighbor – Afghanistan was also on loggerheads with the former. Just after the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the Afghan government raised the issue of Pakhunistan³ and tried to cast doubts on the validity of the Pak-Afghan border – the Durand line.⁴ Afghan leadership tried to block Pakistan's entry into the club of nations by voting against its

membership in the United Nations General Assembly in 1947.

Pakistan foreign policy makers took Indian hegemonic challenge more detrimental than the expansionist approach of the then Soviet Union. Conflict between Pakistan and India was both ideological and territorial that had roots in history while communist Soviet Union was just in search of access to warm waters. China was also a communist state but it was not at odd with Pakistan.

Since independence in 1947, India adopted a hegemonic foreign policy posture. Indian leadership was thinking India as a regional power if not a superpower and assumed a leading role for it. They envisioned Indian borders will be extended from the Hindu Kush Mountains to the Mekong River, that is to say, wherever the influence of Hinduism has

existed in the past. Their earlier friendly overtures to China were based on the hope that there would be an understanding between them and China over their respective spheres of influence in Asia. It was assumed that China would recognize and endorse this Indian claim⁵. To materialize this dream, the India leadership was in mode to tolerate a stable and prosperous Pakistan in the region. To create hurdles the prospects of stability, they thrust a number of problems upon this nascent state. All hopes of peaceful coexistence on the part of Pakistani leadership were dashed to the ground. Looking at the Indian behavior, the founder of Pakistan said,

*“It is very unfortunate that vigorous propaganda has been going on that Pakistan is merely a temporary madness and that Pakistan will have to come into the Indian Union as a penitent, repentant, erring son. It is now clear beyond doubt that it was well-planned, well-organized, and well-directed and the object of it all was to paralyze the new born Dominion of Pakistan.”*⁶

In such a volatile situation, prima facie, Pakistan had viewed the situation through the lens of security perspective. Pakistan's India-centralism, regional constraints, and weaknesses led it to align with the United States-sponsored pacts in the 1950s.⁷

Two factors were enough to create ill blood between Pakistan and India in the days soon after independence. First, the 3rd June plan was never accepted with open heart by the Congress and had the utmost quest to merge Pakistan with India sooner or later. These apprehensions were reinforced by the statements issued by the Congress leaders in India soon after Pakistan won independence. Several congressmen talked about the reunification of India and Pakistan.⁸ This was threatening enough to make those across the border feel insecure. Second, the issue of

Kashmir proved to be the apple of discord between the two newly born neighbors. Claims and counter claims on the princely state brought the two to a point of war. The occupation of Kashmir was noted with grave concern by Pakistan because of its vital importance for Pakistan's defense.⁹ For Pakistan, military support and economic assistance were an urgent requirement in the aftermath of the 1948 War with India over Kashmir.¹⁰

The fear of Indian domination thus became a very factor in guiding Pakistan's internal politics and foreign relations.¹¹ Meager defense coupled with hostile Indian attitude put Pakistan's national security at stake. Pakistan's armed forces, the backbone of defense, were badly equipped and terribly disorganized. Soon these forces had to handle with the mass-scale refugee problems and then engage in countering Indian troops in Kashmir. They had no chance to properly organize its units, get latest equipment and accumulate any ammunition. The plight was seen in every aspect. The military establishment was fully convinced that Pakistan's survival was vitally linked with the establishment of a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led army. The top military leadership was striving hard to make the defense invincible by erecting a state-of-the-art army that could deter any aggression in the region.¹² Civilian leadership also shared the same views with army that if Pakistan had to remain on the world map then the security challenge from India must be coped with at any cost. Thus, the security imperatives led the policy makers to pay special attention to the reorganization of the armed forces that Pakistan inherited after the division of the British Indian military. Almost all units of the armed forces were re-organized. Pakistan procured some weapons and military equipment from a number of Western states for modernization of all the three services of the armed forces. However, the pace of modernization was very slow till 1954-55.¹³

In the backdrop of these security challenges, Pakistan invited the United States to become the principal source of external support for this new nation. This request was an extraordinary one as it was for a loan of nearly US\$2 billion. In exchange for that Pakistan pledged to offer its support to check spillover effect of communism by joining the US camp.¹⁴

The dilapidated condition of Pakistan's armed forces and concern for its borders in the face of territorial disputes with its neighbors, India and Afghanistan, forced Pakistan to look beyond the region for security assistance.¹⁵ Despite Pakistan's strenuous efforts for American military aid, it remained under the US embargo since August 1947 till April 1949. From June to September 1949, talks were held between the US and Pakistani officials. During these meetings, the Pakistani representatives "informally but repeatedly declared their readiness to associate themselves closely with the U.S. in long-range defense planning." Pakistan, the visitors stressed, could be a "sturdy bulwark against Communism." These statements were accompanied by requests for an estimated US\$125 million in military assistance.¹⁶ But, ironically, Pakistan's demands were not complied with by the United States.

The most difficult of all the regional problems faced by the United States was the strained relationship between India and Pakistan on the disputed territory of Kashmir. The US wanted a peaceful solution to the problem as any instability in South Asia would serve the communist cause. But Indian stubborn behavior did not encourage the US to play the due role in resolving this dispute. Being the political and economic center of South Asia, India was deemed to be very important to the United States in the geopolitical terms. Pakistan's strategic worth for the US was only the geographic location of the former.¹⁷ Washington simply remained impartial in the conflict between two South Asian neighbors. Furthermore, South Asia simply did not rank very high among American

priorities during a time of heightened global tensions and escalating demands for limited American resources.¹⁸

In 1949, the communist triumph in China forced Washington to revisit its South Asian policy. Thus, the US tilt toward India was seen. The US policymakers thought that India might emerge as the most effective bulwark against further Communist expansion on the Asian mainland. In October 1950, Nehru's long-awaited state visit to the United States quickly dashed such wishful thinking on the part of US planners. He made it clear to his American hosts that India would not under any circumstances depart from nonaligned policy.¹⁹ Pakistan was the next best option available to fill the vacuum.

In the bipolar world, Pakistan had an option to choose Soviet Union, our next door neighbor that took the lead to invite the Prime Minister of Pakistan in June 1949 to have a state visit to Moscow. This was not a bad option as closer geographical proximity was a factor enough to give a serious thought to the invitation, not to mention its strong economic and military base that could help Pakistan go through the earlier troubled times. However, Pakistani leadership had already decided to keep the communist Soviet Union at bay because of the fact that the former thought that the two cherished divergent ideologies and maintained conflicting interests. Meanwhile US, the other balancing power in international politics also followed the Soviet's suite and sent a gesture of friendship and cooperation. The choice to be made was not easy. The people in the corridors of power in Pakistan were at cross roads. However, the most important decision that had had far reaching impacts on the foreign policy of Pakistan was made when Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan paid an official visit to Washington in May 1950.

The three weeks long visit to Washington set the parameters and direction of Pakistan's foreign policy. This visit brought the

two countries closer and laid the foundation for the long-term US-Pak relations. An American journalist, Walter Lippman noted, "Though Pakistan and America are far apart in space, though they are very different in their ways of life, each has the great responsibilities for the peace and welfare of the mankind, which it cannot meet fully without the help and advice of the other" (Christian Science Monitor, 1950, May). During his first ever visit to the US, the Pakistani Premier emphasized his country's interest in American economic aid and trade investment.²⁰ No doubt, this visit created a better understanding of Pakistan, its policy and problems, yet the demands for military assistance and private capital and investment were not complied with.²¹ But the developments that unfolded in Asia in the following years with respect to the Cold War conflict proved it a misapprehension.

On 25th June, 1950 North Korea sent troops across the thirty eight parallel. The US quickly responded by deploring the Korean move and decided to take the issue to the United Nations (UN). Pakistan fully endorsed the US decision to invoke the UN collective security system against North Korea but Washington asked for more tangible help that regretted by Pakistan on the ground that as long as Pakistan felt threatened by India she could not commit the country's limited security resources for other causes.²² In case of compliance with the US demand, the Prime Minister had to face stern opposition at home. No doubt, Pakistan under Khan's leadership was primarily pro-Western but he was unwilling to align his country fully with US without security guarantee against India. Pakistan sought to trade alignment for American arms that had been a consistent theme of Pakistani diplomacy since partition.²³

Middle East Defense Organization, an idea of bargaining:

The idea of Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) was coined initially by

the British Conservative Government and asked Pakistan to join it. Pakistan refused to join it. By this time United States experts feared that Pakistan might reorient its foreign policy if its leaning to the West did fail in achieving its foreign policy objectives. Pakistani leaders positioned themselves to manipulate that fear to their own advantage. In July 1952, a high-level Pakistani military delegation once again asked American officials for military equipment. Pakistani officials requested \$200 million in military supplies for Pakistan's army and air force.²⁴ The US was still making up its mind for the transaction when the rumors spread of Pakistan's joining the proposed Organization. India openly voice her disapproval to the proposed deal by claiming that weapons so delivered to Pakistan would be used against India instead of Communist Russia. India also argued that any such alliance would lead to an arm race in South Asia besides enabling Pakistan to settle Kashmir Issue through military means. Thus, the US withdrew from making any such deal. The cool shoulder shown by Egypt also flopped the idea of any such organization in the Middle East.

Eisenhower administration and Pak US military relations:

After the Korean War was over, US policy was set forth as the Eisenhower doctrine. It was designed to assist all nations that were resisting communism. The Eisenhower administration negotiated a series of security or mutual defense treaties as well as aid agreements. The main objective was to deter communist aggression.²⁵ To have that purpose met, America advocated the policy of alliances with those countries that either felt threatened from communist expansion or volunteered themselves to the interests of capitalist block for one reason or other. Pakistan was too keen to go the same way.

In May 1953, the US Secretary of State, Foster Dulles, made his first visit to New Delhi and Karachi. While boarding the plane back, Dulles had developed a good opinion

about Pakistan against India as the former had condemned communism and had expressed the resolve to play anticommunist role. He suggested that no more time should be wasted in having a military alliance concluded with Pakistan to check communist threat. Mr. Dulles positive outlook of Pakistan helped the two countries.

The shift in geostrategic and geopolitical situation at international level enhanced the significance of Pakistan in checking communist expansion.²⁶ Meanwhile, political circles in Washington felt threatened by the gestures that if Pakistan did not get the desired response from the US in the due course of time, Pakistan might explore other avenues to have its demand for defense and economic aid met. Though in the beginning the US response was not encouraging but in the early 1950s the changing geostrategic and geopolitical overtures brought the two states closer towards each other.

Pakistan's Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, visited the US in September 1953 to expedite the policy decision in Washington. General Ayub met the US Secretary of State and bluntly told him about the sole purpose of his visit – to acquire military assistance for the Pakistani army. According to the official record of the US State Department, "The Secretary observed, smilingly, that it was none of his business but he hoped that Ayub would get what he came for".²⁷ After General Ayub's departure from US, the then Governor General of Pakistan, Ghulam Muhammad, and Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan rushed to Washington. They just pursued what the army chief had demanded. By this time American administration had decided to honor the long-standing Pakistani demand for military assistance without taking into account the Indian reaction to it. If there was any delay it was to draw the broader parameters of arms aid and to prepare the feasibility report. The Pakistani leadership heaved a sigh of relief on

what was about to start a new chapter in US-Pakistan relations.

In the month of February, 1954 the US President formally announced that Pakistan's request for military assistance had been approved. Shortly thereafter at United States prompting, Pakistan and Turkey concluded a security treaty on 02 April 1954 – the Turko-Pakistan Pact.²⁸ The pact recognized the need for consultation and cooperation in every field for the purpose of promoting the wellbeing and security of their people. It envisaged military assistance and cooperation for the defense of Turkey and Pakistan.²⁹

United States and Pakistan also entered into a formal defense alliance – the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) on 19 May 1954. The United States agreed to provide military equipment, training facilities and other related services to enable Pakistan to maintain its international security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of an area or in the United Nations collective security arrangements and measures. Pakistan was obliged not to use the assistance provided under this agreement for undertaking "any act of aggression against any other nation."³⁰ This sort of arrangement was enough to the satisfaction of Pakistan because it had no offensive designs against any nation including India. MDAA's provisions are a true example of Pakistan's genuine fears and an outlet to remedial measures.

Military and economic aid started flowing in the wake of MDAA but there was a big gap between what Pakistan expected and what it received. The American officials were proposing an aid of \$30 million a year while the recipient hoped to receive as much aid as given to Turkey. The US was well aware of the imbalanced approach towards these two partners and tried to fill the gap by extending membership offer to Pakistan of the recently formed South East Asia Treaty Organization, though geographically she is not part of East Asia.

To begin with Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States in May, 1954. Later in that year it became a member of South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) along with the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. It also joined the Baghdad Pact, another mutual defense organization, with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq in 1955. It was later on renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The United States did not join this organization, but remained closely associated with it since its inception. It was the only Asian country which was a member both of SEATO and CENTO.³¹ The primary objective was met through these mutual defense treaties but at some cost.

1954, the year of pacts and agreements:

This was the second phase of Pakistan's foreign policy. It was marked by transition from an independent position to a multifaceted alignment with the West. This alignment policy was the outcome of an acute sense of insecurity within the regional context, especially the security threats arising from India.³² Though earlier Pakistan sought the US arms but was not willing to commit fully to the Western Camp in the absence of security guarantee against India. However, Pakistan inclusion into the US-backed anti-communist pacts changed the previous stance and closely aligned with the West without any security guarantee by the United States. It was expected by Pakistani leadership that this alignment would provide Pakistan with the arms-aid that, in turn, would substantially bolster the country's security.³³ This kind of mindset pushed Pakistan into the US camp in the Cold war.

Both SEATO and CENTO put Pakistan in a better position to get US assistance. Thus, Pakistan became America's most allied ally in Asia.³⁴ Surprisingly every time Pakistan joined the US sponsored alliances, India responded with protest and threats on the ground that these military alliances would strengthen Pakistan

enough to challenge India. However, it is worth clearing here that Pakistan is only one-fifth of size as compared to India while there is a strong disparity in armed forces. Therefore, Pakistan is in no position to pose challenges to Indian security. In fact, the military aid provided to Pakistan, under different treaties, was designed to give it merely a deterrent force against communist march into South Asia. Even with the aid, the armed forces of Pakistan were not to be more than one-third of India's strength before Sino-Indian border clashes.³⁵

Pakistan's alliance with the US generated substantial tangible gains for the former since 1954 till 1965. The impact of this relationship on Pakistan's armed forces was fairly visible. The army, navy and air force were transformed into modern, well equipped fighting forces. As a result of Pakistan's close alignment with the US, Pakistan's armed forces were reorganized along the American lines and hundreds of Pakistani officers were trained in the United States. Moreover, Pakistan received dollars in millions in concessional sale and defense support assistance. Though the alliance system had certain loopholes like the exclusion of troops in Kashmir and East Pakistan from reorganization program but Pakistan armed forces emerged as well disciplined and well equipped.

Pakistan's inclusion in the US led anti-communist bloc was never a win-win arrangement. This brief period, 1947-55 of US-Pakistan relationship was soon over. Pakistan sacrificed much for the American cause but the later did not prove to be a trustworthy friend, letting the former down off and on. This roller-coaster approach left big question marks on the decision of alignment with the United States.

In August, 1953 Mr. Nehru and Pakistan's Prime Minister agreed after prolonged bilateral negotiations to resolve the issue of Kashmir in accordance with the wishes of Kashmiri people. It was also agreed that an impartial Plebiscite Administration would be appointed to hold plebiscite in the valley. But

Pakistan's entry into the US-backed defense pact provided Nehru with a pretext to back out of his words.³⁶

The Soviet Union's official stance on Kashmir issue also underwent a drastic change. Moscow remained neutral and had abstained from voting whenever the Kashmir matter came up in the United Nations Security Council unless Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955. But the anti-communist posture adopted by Pakistan left no room for the Soviet leadership to have soft corner for the former. Moscow altered its stand by subscribing to the Indian claim that no plebiscite was necessary and that Kashmir was an integral part of India.³⁷ This was a great blow for Pakistan's foreign policy. The communist Soviet Union helped India in maintaining status quo in the Indian held Kashmir on every international forum while the so-called Pakistan's ally – the US never assisted the former in putting an end to the long standing Kashmir dispute.

Despite the anon-alignment policy, India succeeded in getting more economic aid from the US in the wake Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement signed in 1951. Although America had maintained a difference between cold war ally Pakistan and non-aligned India that difference also became blurred as soon as Sino-India war broke out.³⁸ In such a situation Pakistan became more vulnerable and insecure in the face of Indian threat.

Conclusion:

The milestones of Pakistan's Foreign policy were; security against Indian aggression and economic assistance. To achieve these two ends, Pakistan approached the West but no one came to help out Pakistan. Consequently policy makers joined the US backed anti-communist pacts and entered into the anti-Soviet bloc. Pakistan's armed forces emerged the most disciplined and well equipped forces but Pakistan could not achieve the desired objectives in the real sense. As far as defense is concerned, armed forces of Pakistan could not prevent the 1965 Pak-India war from breaking

out. Similarly it failed to save East Pakistan from dismemberment at the hand of India. The dream of territorial integrity further marred when Kashmir, the life-line of Pakistan could not become part of it. Pakistan also became foe of the Soviet Union that helped India to strengthen its hold on Kashmir. Economic objectives of Pakistan also remained frustrated. The economic plight of Pakistan reveals the whole truth.

In short, the cost surpassed the benefit. In other words, this episode of Pakistan's foreign policy was a futile practice in the annals of decision making process of Pakistan foreign policy.

References:

- Bhutto, A. Zulfeqar, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964).
- Hagerty, T, Devin, "The Development of American Defense Policy towards Pakistan, 1947-1954". *The Fletcher Forum*, Summer, 1986.
- Jabeen, Musarrat, and Muhammad S. Mazhar, "SECURITY GAME: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan", *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* Volume 49, No. 1 (Summer 2011).
- Khan, Zulfeqar, "A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relations: 1947-1977", *IPRI journal* XIII, no 2 (summer 2013).
- Khan, Ayaz, Jamshed, seminar on "New Directions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Geo Politics, Security and development", Department of international Relations and Area Study Centre, University of Sind, Jamshoro, 2007.
- Khan, Ayub, *Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
- Khan, Ayub, "The Pakistan-American Alliance, Foreign Affairs", *Foreign Affairs journal*, January issue, (1964), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23567/mohammed-ayub-khan/the-pakistan-american-alliance>.
- Kux, Dennis, "The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies", (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
- Macmohan, J, Robert, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military

Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954", The Journal of American History, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Dec., 1988).

Rizvi, Askari, Hassan, The military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997, (Lahore, Sang e Meel Publications, 2013).

Rezvi, Askari, Hassan, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: an overview. 1947-2004, Pildat, No 11, (April, 2004).

Sathasivam, Kanishkan, Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan, and US Foreign Policy, (Hampshire, Ashgate publishing limited, 2005).

¹ Zulfeqar Khan, "A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relations: 1947-1977", IPRI journal XIII, no 2 (summer 2013).

² Z. A. Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1964).

³ Pakhtunistan issue is the irredentist Afghanistan vigorously to the Pashtu speaking areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as NWFP) and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan.

⁴ Durand line is the name given to Pak-Afghan border after the Durand Line Agreement signed between British Indian government foreign security, Sir Mortimer Durand and Amir Abdul Rehman of Afghanistan in 1893.

⁵ Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance, Foreign Affairs", Foreign Affairs journal, January issue, (1964), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23567/mohammed-ayub-khan/the-pakistan-american-alliance>.

⁶ Jamshed Ayaz Khan, Seminar on "New Directions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Geo Politics, Security and development", Department of international Relations and Area Study centre, University of Sind, Jamshoro, 2007.

⁷ Zulfeqar Khan. A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relations: 1947-1977 as cited above.

⁸ Hassan A. Rizvi, The military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997, (Lahore, Sang e Meel Publications, 2013).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Zulfeqar Khan, A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relations as cited above.

¹¹ Hassan A. Rizvi, The military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997, (Lahore, Sang e Meel Publications, 2013).

¹² Ayub Khan, Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

¹³ Hassan A. Rezvi, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: an overview. 1947-2004, Pildat, No 11, (April, 2004).

¹⁴ Robert J. Macmohan, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954", The Journal of American History, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Dec., 1988).

¹⁵ Devin T. Hagerty, "The Development of American Defense Policy towards Pakistan, 1947-1954". The FLETCHER FORUM, summer, 1986.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Kanishkan Sathasivam, Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan, and US Foreign Policy, (Hampshire, Ashgate publishing limited, 2005).

¹⁸ Robert T. Macmohan, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: as cited above.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Dennis Kux, "The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies", (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

²¹ Musarrat Jabeen and Muhammad S. Mazhar, "SECURITY GAME: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan", Pakistan Economic and Social Review Volume 49, No. 1 (Summer 2011).

²² Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan cited as above.

²³ Robert T. Macmohan, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia as cited above.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Musarrat JABEEN and Muhammad S.MAZHAR. SECURITY GAME: as cited above.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Macmohan, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia as cited above.

²⁸ Hassan A. Rezvi, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: an overview as cited above.

²⁹ *The West Australian (Perth, WA: 1879 - 1954)*, Article Pacts with Pakistan under fire, **Tuesday 11 May 1954**, <http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/49634015>

³⁰ Hassan A. Rezvi, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: an overview as cited above.

³¹ Ayub Khan, The Pakistan-American Alliance as cited above.

³² Hassan A. Rezvi, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: an overview. As cited above.

³³ Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan as cited above.

³⁴ Ayub Khan, Friends not masters as cited above.

³⁵ . Ayub Khan, The Pakistan-American Alliance, as cited above.

³⁶ Ayub Khan, The Pakistan-American Alliance as cited above.

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ *ibid.*